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Acronyms
• Analog Devices (ADI)
• Destructive SEE (DSEE)
• Electronics and Electrical Engineering (EEE)
• Leadless Chip Carrier (LCC)
• linear energy transfer (MeV•cm2/mg) (LET)
• equivalent linear energy transfer (LETEQ)
• millibarn, 1 barn = 10-24 cm2 (mbarn)
• multi-bit upset (MBU)
• operational amplifier (op amp)
• single event burnout (SEB)
• single event dielectric rupture (SEDR)
• single event effect (SEE)
• single event functional interrupt (SEFI)
• single event gate rupture (SEGR)
• single event latchup (SEL)
• sensitive volume (SV)
• worst-case (WC)
Summary of the Failures
• In 200-MeV proton test, Dan Clymer of Lockheed-Martin saw 
unexpected failures in an Analog Devices (ADI) OP470 op amp
• Capacitors in OP470 known to fail due to heavy ion SEE, but:
•Required ions w/ LET>20 MeVcm2/mg, while proton-Si collisions 
produce LET<14 MeVcm2/mg
• And it gets weirder
•Failures only seen with parts in Leadless Chip Carrier (LCC) package
•If lid of LCC package removed, no failures seen
• A clue: LCC lids had gold plating on the underside (facing die)
Quadrant of ADI OP470 quad op amp
Capacitors• Tests on other devices 
showed gold lid was the 
integral to the failure 
mode.
• Note that most cross 
sections <<10-11 cm2.
• List not exhaustive.
Adapted from T. Turflinger et al., IEEE Trans. On Nuclear
Science, Vol. 62, no. 6,p. 2468.
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Part Package Tested C. Section Voltage
AD667 LCC FP 2 None N/A
AMP01 LCC 11 2.70E-12 ±15.0
OP12 Custom 2 3.50E-12 ±18.0
OP27 Custom 2 4.20E-12 ±17.0
OP200 LCC 2 1.80E-12 ±15.0
OP400 LCC 1 2.00E-12 ±18.0
OP470 Multiple 106 4.90E-12 ±14.0
OP471 Custom 1 6.10E-11 ±17.0
Failure Mechanism
• Proton beam knocks Au 
nucleus out of Au layer
• Excited Au nucleus 
oscillates then fissions into 
two nuclei (30<Z<50)
• Fission fragment strikes 
capacitor, depositing 
enough charge to rupture 
capacitor oxide (<100 nm)
• Failure more likely if ion 
incident normally to device 
surface
• Almost all energy of fission 
ions comes from fission
• Ions have short range.
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Daughter Product Yields vs. Z and E
E     
Z
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
43.6 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 8.E-09 0.E+00 8.E-09 2.E-08 6.E-08 9.E-08 2.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 7.E-07 9.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06
45.5 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 8.E-09 3.E-08 6.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 6.E-07 8.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06
47.5 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 2.E-08 2.E-08 3.E-08 5.E-08 2.E-07 2.E-07 4.E-07 6.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06
49.4 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 8.E-09 0.E+00 4.E-08 1.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 7.E-07 9.E-07 2.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 5.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 4.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06
51.3 0.E+00 8.E-09 0.E+00 3.E-08 4.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 4.E-07 6.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 5.E-06 5.E-06 5.E-06 6.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06
53.3 8.E-09 2.E-08 3.E-08 8.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 4.E-07 6.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 4.E-06 6.E-06 6.E-06 7.E-06 7.E-06 6.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06
55.2 2.E-08 4.E-08 2.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 6.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 6.E-06 6.E-06 8.E-06 7.E-06 8.E-06 7.E-06 6.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06
57.1 2.E-08 2.E-08 7.E-08 2.E-07 3.E-07 6.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 5.E-06 7.E-06 7.E-06 9.E-06 8.E-06 8.E-06 8.E-06 6.E-06 4.E-06 4.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06
59.1 6.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 6.E-07 8.E-07 2.E-06 2.E-06 4.E-06 5.E-06 6.E-06 9.E-06 9.E-06 1.E-05 9.E-06 9.E-06 8.E-06 6.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 9.E-07
61.0 2.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 5.E-07 7.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 4.E-06 5.E-06 7.E-06 8.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 9.E-06 9.E-06 7.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 9.E-07
62.9 7.E-08 2.E-07 4.E-07 6.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 5.E-06 6.E-06 8.E-06 9.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 9.E-06 8.E-06 7.E-06 5.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 5.E-07
64.9 2.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 6.E-06 7.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 9.E-06 8.E-06 6.E-06 4.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 7.E-07 4.E-07
66.8 3.E-07 5.E-07 8.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 5.E-06 7.E-06 9.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 8.E-06 7.E-06 5.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 5.E-07 3.E-07
68.7 3.E-07 6.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 6.E-06 8.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 9.E-06 7.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 7.E-07 3.E-07 1.E-07
70.6 4.E-07 8.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 5.E-06 7.E-06 8.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 9.E-06 8.E-06 6.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 9.E-07 5.E-07 2.E-07 8.E-08
72.6 5.E-07 8.E-07 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 5.E-06 7.E-06 9.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 1.E-05 7.E-06 6.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 5.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-08
74.5 6.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 6.E-06 8.E-06 9.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-05 9.E-06 9.E-06 6.E-06 5.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 7.E-07 3.E-07 9.E-08 2.E-08 4.E-08
76.4 9.E-07 2.E-06 2.E-06 4.E-06 5.E-06 6.E-06 7.E-06 8.E-06 9.E-06 9.E-06 8.E-06 7.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 5.E-07 2.E-07 5.E-08 8.E-09 8.E-09
78.4 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 5.E-06 6.E-06 7.E-06 8.E-06 8.E-06 8.E-06 6.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 5.E-07 2.E-07 9.E-08 3.E-08 8.E-09 0.E+00
80.3 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 6.E-06 6.E-06 6.E-06 7.E-06 7.E-06 6.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 7.E-07 4.E-07 1.E-07 3.E-08 8.E-09 0.E+00 0.E+00
82.2 1.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 4.E-06 5.E-06 5.E-06 6.E-06 6.E-06 6.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 6.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 6.E-08 3.E-08 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00
84.2 1.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 5.E-06 5.E-06 5.E-06 5.E-06 4.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 7.E-07 4.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-08 2.E-08 8.E-09 8.E-09 8.E-09 0.E+00
86.1 1.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 4.E-06 4.E-06 4.E-06 4.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 7.E-07 4.E-07 2.E-07 9.E-08 2.E-08 2.E-08 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00
88.0 1.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 8.E-07 4.E-07 2.E-07 1.E-07 3.E-08 2.E-08 0.E+00 0.E+00 8.E-09 0.E+00 0.E+00
90.0 1.E-06 1.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 3.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 6.E-07 5.E-07 3.E-07 1.E-07 3.E-08 3.E-08 2.E-08 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00
91.9 9.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 2.E-06 1.E-06 8.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 1.E-07 5.E-08 3.E-08 2.E-08 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00
Adapted from T. 
Turflinger et al., 
IEEE Trans. On Nuclear
Science, Vol. 62, no. 6,
p. 2468.
To be published on nepp.nasa.gov. 5
First the Bad News…Then The Good
• Cross section per Au nucleon~35 mbarn, or 
3.5E-26 cm2 @ 200 MeV
• Varies from 6.5 mb at 50 MeV to about 49 mb @ 
300 MeV
• 1 cm2 of 1-um thick Au foil has ~5.9E18 Au nuclei
• 1E10 200-MeV protons/cm2→2100 Au fissions
• Daughter products have 30<LET<40 MeVcm2/mg
Although high LET, daughter products are  short range (<17 µm)
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SEE Cross Section Scales w/ Deposited Charge, Not LET
• Given LET and flux ranges, main 
concern is destructive SEE (DSEE)
• Most DSEE have deep sensitive volumes
• Depth, d~10s of microns
• SEE cross section scales w/ deposited 
energy Edep, not LET
• For most DSEE, energy Edep for fission 
product limited by ion range, not LET
• GCR, SPE and most accelerator ions 
traverse entire SV w/ ~constant LET
• Risk limits based on short ion range
• Range << SV depth
• Finite propagation length in Au and 
overburden above SV
• Define Equivalent LET, LETEQ:
,
ρ=Si density, d=SV depth
( )d
ELET depEQ ×ρ=
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Look at Fluence vs. LETEQ
• LETEQ better captures physics than LET
• More realistic picture of DSEE threat
• Makes it easier to compare threat to 
environments where ion energy 
deposition is not range limited.
• Figure at right shows decrease of LETEQ
as SV depth increases.
• Edep = energy deposited in SV depth 
less than range of ion
• Edep = total ion energy if SV depth 
greater than ion range
• Represents worst case.
• SV for SEL, SEB and SEGR often >30 µm
• SV for dielectric rupture in ADI op amps 
thought to be shallow—worst case.
To be published on nepp.nasa.gov. 8
Transport through Materials Also Degrades LET Spectrum
• Each additional µm of Au produces more ions 
bud also degrades ions already produced.
• WC fission product range in Au is ~6.5 µm
• Overburden on top of SV also degrades LET 
spectrum
• May include passivation, oxides, metal, etc
• Thicknesses here are in Si equivalent
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Process Does Not Create New Failure Modes in Space
• Space Radiation Environments Contain Ions w/ 1≤ Z ≤92
• Au fission events merely increase flux of ions w/ 30≤ Z ≤50 and 20≤ LET ≤45
• For this threat, look for parts susceptible to serious errors w/ onset LET>20
• Nondestructive SEE, such as SEFI, MBU, stuck bits…
• Destructive SEE, such as SEL, SEB, SEGR
• For SEL, SV often>>10 µm, so ions are range limited 
• ∴ Analyze in terms of LETEQ
• For SEGR, often have significant overburden on top of SV, ion Z, E, LET and angle of incidence are important
• ∴Use transported Environment and analyze in terms of LETEQ
• Analysis for SEB is similar to SEGR
• Mechanisms for other failures (SEDR, Schottky diode failures, etc.) may not be fully understood—use worst-
case appropriate (e.g. taking into account transported environment, angular dependence if known, etc.)
• Dielectric failures of ADI op amps are probably a worst case
• Onset LET ~20 MeVcm2/mg
• SV depth is shallow
• Use energy dependence of cross section, transported environment, angular dependence (WC at normal incidence)
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Process for Addressing Risk
Screen Parts 
List for Parts 
w/DSEE +other 
serious modes  
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Conclusions
• Proton-induced fission of high-Z materials can generate large fluxes of high-LET, high-Z ions
• Can dominate the SEE rate for some SEE failures in fairly proton-rich environments
• However, fission daughter products have low energy per nucleon
• For Au fission products, range < 17 µm in Si; <6.5 µm
• All fission product ions are on the low-energy side of the Bragg Peak
• In assessing risk due to high-Z materials in parts and packaging consider that
• This mechanism cannot generate new failure/error modes; it only increases rate of pre-existing ones
• If  Onset LET  for failure > 45 MeVcm2/mg, this mechanism will not contribute;  >40 then contribution negligible
• Lower limit if concern depends on environment; for GEO, likely negligible if LET0<15; for ISS, if LET0<8 MeVcm2/mg
• Using actual energy dependence of σ(p + Au→fission) significantly reduces ion flux
• Short fission ion range means that ion LET degraded by passing through high-Z material + any overburden
• More high-Z material means more ions, but most additional ions will have 20<LET<30, rather  than 30<LET<40
• Short fission ion range coupled with deep sensitive volumes typical of SEL, SEB and SEGR mean these threats 
pose less risk than that for the ADI capacitor failures or other modes with shallow SV
• Angular dependence of SEB, SEGR will also lower rate for these failure modes.
• Capacitor failures like those seen in ADI probably present a worst case for this issue
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